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signor, unless void for want of delivery
of the chose of action assigned to the
assignee."
In Gregg v. Sloan, 76 Va. 497,
debtors of North Carolina conveyed their
property in trust to secure the payment
of their debts, including a debt due them
from a citizen of Virginia. The deed
was properly recorded in North Carolina,
but before it was recorded in Virginia, a
Virginia citizen attached the debt, and
the land securing it. It was held that
the assignee had the prior title. See
Richardson v. Rogers, 45 Mich. 591.
The recent case of Atherton v. Ives, 20
Fed. Rep. 894, fully sustains this princi-
ple. In that case the deed of assignment
was legally executed in New York, by
residents of that state, and included per-
sonal property in the state of Kentucky.
After the assignment was made, this pro-
perty was attached by a citizen of Ken-
tucky. It was insisted that the assign-
ment should not be sustained against a
resident attaching creditor, because it
was invalid by the laws of Kentucky,
inasmuch as it gave preferences, and that
whether invalid or not, comity did not
require that it should be sustained against
a citizen of Kentucky. The assignee's
title was held to prevail over that of the
attaching creditor, and it was held that
the assignment was not invalid .by Ken-
tucky's laws because of preferences, and
would have been valid if it had been made
in Kentucky, and that comity required
that assignments made in other states
should be respected, unless contrary to
some positive law of Kentucky. The
court was also of the opinion that no dis-
tinction should be taken between "home
creditors" and non-resident ones, unless




ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS. 2
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.3
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.4
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND. 5
ACTION.
Damages to Adjacent Property Owners from Public Improvement in
a Street-Liability therefor, upon, whom 'it Rests- Contribution of
Railroad Company to Cst.-The mere contributing of material aid by
a private individual to a city, to enable the latter to execute a public
work not unlawful in itself, is not necessarily attended with liability on
the part of him who extends such aid, for injury that may thereby
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1884. The cases will probably appear in 114 U. S. Rep.
2 From B. D. Turner, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 44 Ark. Rep.
3 'From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in Ill Ill. Rep.
4 From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter ; to appear in 39 N. J. Eq. Rep.
5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 14 R. I. Rep.
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result to private rights: Culbertson and Blair Packing and Provision
Co. v. City of Chicago, 111 111.
So, where a railway company entered into a contract with a city, by
which the former agreed to pay a given sum on the cost of a viaduct
proposed to be constructed in a street, there being no illegal motive in
tendering such aid to the city, it was held, that the railway company
could not be held jointly liable with the city in tort for a private injury
to adjoining property caused by the viaduct: Id.
A city alone has authoricy to construct a viaduct in a street, and
when one is so constructed by the city, even when done under the joint
superintendence of a public official of the city and a chief engineer of a
railroad company, and the company paid a part of the price of the
improvement, it was held, that the viaduct was still public property
belonging to the city alone. The aid furnished by th4 railway, in such
case, may be treated as a mere private donation: Id.
ARBITRATION.
Submi;sion to Two Arbitrators and Disagreement-.Necessity of a New
Hearing on Selection of a Third Arbitrator.-W here a controversy is
submitted to two arbitrators, under an agreement for the selection of a
third one in case the two are unable to agree, and after a hearing and
disagreement the two first appointed select a third man, an award made
by two of them, without giving the party against whom it is rendered
an opportunity of being heard, is void, and no recovery can be had
upon it: Alexander v. Cunningham, 111 Ill.
Award- E~tent of-tems not condered.-An award cannot be'
extended beyond the things submitted ; and even if the language of the
submission be broad enough to cover a claim subsequently sought to be
enforced, yet, if it be clearly made to appear that the claim was not
before the arbitrators, and was not passed upon by them, the award will
not bar it: Exec. of Lee v. Admr. of Dolan, 39 N. J. Eq.
ASSIGNMENT.
Unrecorded Hortgage-Validity against Assignee.-A. executed a
mortgage to B. of certain personalty. The mortgage was made and
received in good faith. The mortgagee never recorded the mortgage
nor took possession of the property, but there was no collusion between
the parties nor design to give the mortgagor a fictitious credit. A.
subsequently made an assignment "of all his estate and property" for
the benefit of his creditors; on a bill of interpleader brought by the
assignee : Held, that the mortgagee was entitled to the proceeds of the
mortgaged property: .Teldfurther, that the creditors were entitled only
under the assignment, and that the assignee succeeded only to the
rights of the assignor: Heldfurther, that Pub. Stat. R. I., cap. 176,
§ 9, which provides that "no mortgage of personal property hereafter
made shall be valid against any other person than the parties thereto,
unless possession of the mortgaged property be delivered to and re-
tained by the mortgagee, or unless the said mortgage be recorded,"
must be construed in accordance with the above holding: Wilson v.
Esten, 14 R. I
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ATTORNEY.
Contract for Conditional .Fee.-Under the statute authorizing the
assignment of counsel to indigent suitors, the complainant was assigned
to assist, the defendant in a suit to recover from a life insurance com-
pany the amount of a policy on her husband's life. The complainant
thereupon made an agreement with her to prosecute the claim, and, if
successful, to receive one-half of the amount recovered, and if not suc-
cessful, to receive nothing. He did prosecute the suit, paid the costs
incurred, and recovered the amount of the policy, $1000, besides $339.27
interest thereon : field, that he was entitled to one-half of this whole
amount: .assell v. Van Houten, 39 N. J. Eq.
BANKRUPTCY. See Debtor and Creditor.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Commerce between the States-Tax on.-The state of Pennsylvania
having attempted to collect a tax on the capital stock of a New Jersey
corporation, running a ferry between the two states, on the river Dela-
ware, on the ground that the corporation was doing business in Pennsyl-
vania, Held, that such tax was illegal and void as an attempted exaction
upon inter-state commerce: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Sidewalk-Removal of Ice and Snow-Public Burden laid on Citizen
-Pulice Power.-A city has not the constitutional power to require the
owner or-obcupant of premises to keep the sidewalk and gutters in front
thereof free from snow and ice, or to sprinkle the same with ashes or
sand where the snow and ice cannot be removed without injury to the
pavement, and inflict a fine on him for a neglect or failure to do so.
The ruling in Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 88 Ill. 554, adhered to:
City of Chicago v. O'Brien, 111 Ill.
A sidewalk in a city, though devoted to the use of pedestrians, is
nevertheless a portion of a public highway, as much so as the street.
They are both free to be properly used and enjoyed by the entire pub-
lic, and are constructed alike for their use: Id.
The police power of a state, comprehensive as it is, has its limitations.
It cannot be held to sanction the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation, however essential it may be for the pub-
lie health, safety, &c. Upon the like principle, a purely public burden
cannot be laid upon a private individual except as authorized in cases
to exercise the right of eminent domain, or by virtue of proper proceed-
ings to enforce special assessments or special taxation : Id.
Statute compelling Owners of Dams to place Fishways therein.-The
legislature may impose a duty on owners of dams to place therein suit-
able fishways,.in order that the free passage of fish may not be obstructed.
And the owner of the dam cannot by occupancy or user for any length
of time, acquire a prescriptive right as against the public, so as to pre-
vent the enforcement of the provisions of the statute against him : Par-
ker v. The People, 111 Ill.
Sidewalks- Ordinance requiring Owner to keep in Repair.-A city
cannot, by ordinance, prescribe a fine or penalty to be imposed on the
owner or occupant of a lot for a failure to repair the sidewalk in front
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of the same. Keeping sidewalks in repair is referable to the same power
as for constructing new improvements, and cannot be required to be
done by the abutting owner or occupant, at his own expense, either by
the exercise of the police power, or by fines and penalties prescribed by
ordinance, or by direct legislative action: City of Chicago v. &osby,
111 Ill.
CONTRACT. See Sunday.
Subject to Approval-Failure to Approve.-A satute provided that
the Board of Public Works in the city of Providence might hire such
employees as it deemed ndedful, "and agree with them for their com-
pensation, provided, however, that when such compensation shall exceed
the sum of $1000 per annum, such compensation shall be subject to the
approval of the city council * * * which said compensation shall be
paid out of the city treasury :" Of the employees so hired, the city
council approved the compensation of all except two, who were hired at
more than $1000 per annum, and in regard to whom the council took
no action : Held, that these two were entitled to the pay agreed on
with the Board of Public Works : .ield, further, that the city council
could disapprove the compensation agreed on by the Board of Public
Works or approve it with a reduction in amount, but could not, by
mere non-action, defeat the agreement made by the board : Mlfathewson
v. Tripp, 14 R. I.
By Letter or Telegraph- When completed-A contract by letter is
completed the instant the letter accepting the offer is mailed, and is valid
and binding whether the letter of acceptance is received or not. But
where anything else is left to be settled in respect to an offer by mail or
telegraph, the acceptance of the offer by telegraphing will not complete
the contract where the dispatch does not reach its destination : fiaas v.
.Mlyers, 111 Ill.
A. and B. contemplated making a large purchase of cattle in the West,
and it was agreed that A. should go to see the cattle, and telegraph back
to B. the price per head if a purchase was made, when B. was to reply
by telegraph, without delay, saying "yes," if he was willing to take a
third interest in the purchase, and then A. was to telegraph back to' B.
the estimated amount required to pay a third interest, which B. was to
place to the credit of A. and his brother, in a Chicago bank, so that the
latter might draw on the same, and cause the bank to telegraph that fact
to A. A. bought the cattle for $55,000, and telegraphed B. the price
per head, and he answered "yes," which dispatch never reached A.
Later, B. sent another dispatch to A., saying if the cattle were good
there was no danger in buying them, which was received on the same
day that A. and another had concluded the purchase by paying the
necessary advance. On the next day B. arrived, and offered to pay his.
share of the price, which was declined: Held, that under the circum-
stances the sending of the first dispatch accepting a share in the pur-
chase,which never reached its destination, did not complete the contract
and make A. and B. partners in the purchase, there being something
else to be done besides a mere acceptance, to carry out the contract, and
also that B.'s offer to pay on the day after the purchase, and payment
of the price, was too late: Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW.
Larceny-Possession of Proerty-Evidence.-Possession of stolen
property is a fact from which the possessor's complicity in the larceny
may be inferred ; but possession alone is not sufficient to sustain a con-
viction. It must appear that the property was recently stolen ; the pos-
session must be unexplained, and in some form involve an assertion of
property in the possessor: Shepherd v. The State, 44 Ark.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See .Assignment; Payment.
Holding of Legal Title-Right of Creditor obtaining Judgment for
Tort-Estoppel.-The complainant recovered a judgment at law against
the defendant's brother for false imprisonment, and afterwards filed a
creditor's bill to set aside, as fraudulent, two conveyances of land by
the brother to the defendant. The evidence showed satisfactorily that
the lands in question, in fact belonged to the defendant, although the
legal title thereto had been in the name of his brother ; Held, that, as
the cause of the action at law had been a tort, there was, against the
defendant, no ground of estoppel such as sometimes exists where the
cause of action is founded on a contract, and the credit has been given
under the belief that the debtor was the true owner of the property, of
which he had the legal title only, but not the equitable title : Lillis v.
Gallagher, 39 N. J. Eq.
Fraudulent Conveyance -Subsequent Bankruptcy-Eclusive right of
Assignee.-The right to recover property conveyed in fraud of creditors
by a debtor subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt, is vested in his assignee
alone, and the failure of his assignee to bring an action to recover the
property within the time limited by the bankrupt law, does not transfer
the right to bring such action to the creditors of the bankrupt : Jxrs.
of Mc Cartin v. Perry, 39 N. J. Eq.
Fraudulent Conveyane-Right of Execution Purchaser to Avoid.-A
purchaser of real estate at an execution sale may in equity avoid convey-
ances previously made by the judgment-debtor in fraud of his creditors:
Belcher v. Arnold, 14 R. I.
DEED. See Gift.
DURESS
Fear of Prosecution of Son.-When a son bad been guilty of embez-
zlement and his mother made a note and executed a mortgage to the
employer from whom he had embezzled, and the court was satisfied that
the mother's controlling motive was to protect her son from exposure
and prosecution : Held, that she was not a free agent and that the note
and mortgage should be annulled and cancelled: Foley v. Greene, 14 R. I.
The maxim In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis, does not
apply to such a case : Id.
EJECTMENT. See .Municipal Corporation.
EQUITY. See .Notice; Specific Performance.
Policy of Insurance-Reformation after Loss-Mistake.-A policy of
insurance issued in the name of the agent of the owner of the vessel
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insured, instead of in the name of the principal, through the mistake
of the insurance company's agent in preparing the applicatian for the
policy, without any representation or mistake of the owner or applicant
for such insurance, may be rectified after the loss of the vessel, the act
of the company's agent in such case being that of the company and
not of the insured, notwithstanding the fact that he signed the applica-
tion with his own name " for applicant :" 1Hill v. Millville Alut. Mfar.
and Firelns. Co., 39 N. J. Eq.
Ne exeat-Holding of.Defendant in Custody.-Statements by a de-
fendant who was subsequently arrested on a ve exeat, made to complain-
ant's lawyer, that if suits should be begun against him, and he should
be likely to get the worst of it, or if any order should be made against
him by any court, his (defendant's) lawyer would find it out beforehand
and would let him know, so that he could and would leave the state
befo~re they could do anything with him, accompanied by other state-
ments, that complainant and her father were both poor, and that he
would law them both to death, if they attempted any suits against him,
and that he had put all his property out of his hands, but still had the
benefit of it, are sufficient, on an application for his discharge, to hold
him in custody under the sie exeat: Cary v. Car,, 39 N. J. Eq.
Practice-Decree Pro (onfesso-Delay in Application for Re-issue of
Patent cannot be set up after such Decree.-By the practice of the
United States Supreme Court, a decree pro co)fesso is not a decree as,
of course, according to the prayer of the bill, nor merely such as the
complainant chooses to make it; but it is made (or should be) by the
court, according to what is proper to be decreed upon the statements
of the bill assumed to be true: Thomson v. Wooster, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1884.
After the entry of such a decree and while it stands unrevoked, the
defendants are barred from alleging anything in derogation of it; or
from questioning its correctness on appeal, unless on the face of the bill
it appears manifest that it was erroneously and improperly granted: Id.
Although a delay of fourteen years in the application for the re-issue
of a patent is strongly presumed to be unreasonable, yet the court can-
not say, as a matter of law, that it is not susceptible of explanation; and
this defence cannot be set up after a decree pro confesso : Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
What is a Final Judgment.-Tbe judgment of the state Supreme
Court was, that the judgment of the state District Court "be, and the
same is hereby reversed with costs, with directions to the Superior
Court of Los Angeles county to enter judgment upon the findings for
plaintiff, as prayed for in his complaint:" Held, to be final for the pur-.
pose of a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States'
.Mower v. Pletcher, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
EvIrDN.. See Criminal Law.
FRAUD. See Husband and Wife.
Vo3. XXXIII.-53
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FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Tenants in Common- Contracts.-The doctrine of part performance
to take a parol contract for the sale of land out of the operation of the
Statute of Frauds, does not apply to contracts between tenants in com-
mon for the sale of one tenant's interest to the other. Each tenant is
already in possession, and one cannot assume exclusive possession under
and in pursuance of the contract. Their contracts with each other
must be in writing duly signed: Raines v. .McGlone, 44 Ark.
Where one tenant in common by parol contract sells his moiety of
the land to his co-tenant, and afterwards repudiates the contract and
conveys his interest to another purchaser with notice of the facts, the
latter cannot recover it in equity from the co-tenant purchaser except
upon return to him of his purchase-money and half of all taxes and cost
of improvements paid by him, and interest from the time of their pay-
ment: Id.
GIFT.
Donatio causa morts-Essentials.-To establish a gift causa, mortis,
the evidence must show not only that the person in extremis designated
with proper distinctness the thing given and the donee, but it must also
show that the property was presently to pass, and that the intention
was carried into effect by an actual or effective delivery: Newton v.
Snyder, 44 Ark.
Delivery to a third person for a donee, is as effective as delivery to
the donee ; but delivery to an agent as agent for the giver to perform
the act or make delivery only after the giver's death, would amount to
nothing: Id.
Delivery of Deed-Distinction between a Deed and a Will- Volun-
tary Settlement.-A testamentary disposition of pyoperty is ambulatory
until the death of the testator, when it takes effect; but a deed for an
interest in land must take effect upon its execution or not at all. A
party cannot make a deed for land and retain its custody, and have it
operate as a conveyance only after his death. It takes effect at once or
not at all: Cline v. Jones, 111 Ill.
A conveyance of land or a deed may be good as a voluntary settle-
ment, however, though it be retained by the grantor in his possession
until his death, when the circumstances, aside from the retention of the
deed, do not show the grantor did not intend it to operate immedi-
ately: Id.
A father having previously made gifts of property to all of his chil-
dren, except a daughter, went before a justice of the peace and executed
a deed of conveyance of a tract of land to her, and acknowledged the
same, stating that it would make all his children equal; but he re-
tained the deed in his possession, with no present intention it should
take immediat6 effect, but to be operative only at his death, or on the
daughter moving upon and occupying the property, which she never
did. It was held, after his death, that the deed never took effect, and
that theland therein described passed to his heirs, generally : .d.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Insurance.
Contract between-Fraud.-The legislation of this state, enlarging
the capacity of a married woman to acquire and dispose of property,
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does not give her capacity to make a legal contract with her husband:
.Executor of Farmer v. Farmer et al., 39 N. J. Eq.
A wife may bestow her property, by gift, on her husband, or she may
make a contract with him which will be upheld in equity, but the courts
always examine such transactions with an anxious watchfulness and
dread of undue influence: 1d.
Where a contract is made by parties holding confidential relations, so
that it is probable that they did not deal on terms of equality, but that
unfair advantage might have been taken by the stronger party of the
weaker, there the burden, if the contract is assailed, rests on the
stronger party to show that no advantage was taken, otherwise fraud
will be presumed: Id.
INFANT.
Avoidance of Deed- Covenants-Subseguent Quit-claim Deed.-A deed
executed by an infant may be avoided by him after maturity, by any act
unequivocally manifesting an intention to avoid it; and a reconveyance
to another not in privity with the first grantee, is conclusive evidence
of such intention, and disaffirms the first deed; and this, whether the
last be a quit-claim deed or a deed with covenants of warranty: Bagley
v. Fletcher, 44 Ark.
The deed of an infant will pass his estate subject to disaffirmance
after his maturity, but the covenants in his deed are absolutely void: Id.
INSURANcE. See Equit l.
Policy in favor of Wife--Subseguent Petition for Divorce.-A. took
out policy on his wife's life, payable in four years to her if living and
if not living to himself. He paid the premiums, retained the policy
and received payments made upon it. She was living at the maturity
of the policy, but had filed a petition for divorce. A statute provided,
"Any policy or policies of insurance or part thereof which shall not
exceed in the aggregate to the sum of ten thousand dollars, made by
an insurance company on the life of any person and expressed to be for
the benefit of a married woman, whether effected by herself or by her
husband, or by any other person on her behalf, shall enure to her sepa-
rate use and benefit, independently of her husband and of his creditors
and representatives, and also independently of any other person effecting
the same on her behalf, his creditors and representatives, and such pol-
icy may be sued in the name of the person beneficially interested therein,
or in the name of the representative of such person." H eld, that th
wife was entitled to the amount due on the policy at its maturity:
,LEtna L fe Ins. Co. v. Mason, 14 R. I.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Equit/-Anaogy/ to Law.-A. transferred to B. certain corporate
stock, vesting the legal title in B., who held it as a chattel mortgage.
After default by A. in the conditions of the mortgage, and after B. had
subsequent to such default held and treated the stock as his own for
more than six years, A. filed a bill in equity to redeem. Held, that the
bill could not be sustained : Greene v. Dishpeau, 14 R. I.
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Lis PENDENS. See Notice.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Probable Cause-Judicial Finding -In an action for malicious prose-
cution brought by A. against B. : Held, that a judicial finding in the
fbrmer action in favor of B.. and against A., by the court of original
jurisdiction, is conclusive of probable cause, when such finding is not
procured by unfair means, even if such finding is reversed on appeal:
Welch v. Boston & Providence Railroad, 14 R. I.
MANDAMUS.
For what it may not issue to Inferior Court.-A mandamus will not
issue to an inferior court to compel it to confbrm its judgment to the
finding in the case, when a motion to amend the judgment in that par-
ticular has been entertained by the court and the amendment refused
because the court was of opinion that the judgment had been correctly
recorded: Ex parte Morgan, S. C. U. S., October Term 1884.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Contract.
MINES AND MINING.
Sale of an Interest in a Mining Partnershap.-One member of a
mining partnership, has the right, without consulting his associates, to
sell his interest in the partnership to a stranger, and such a sale does
not dissolve the partnership or injure any right or property of the other
associates : Bissell v. Foss, S. (. U. S., October Term 1884.
MORTGAGE. See Assig ent.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Action; Constitutional Law; Contract.
Acquiring Real Estate by Possession-Ejectment.-A municipal cor-
poration may acquire realty by possession and for other than municipal
purposes: New Shoreham v. Ball, 14 R. I.
In ejeetment wherein the plaintiff's title rested on possession for more
than twenty years, the locus was a long, sandy waste along the seashore,
and the defendants were mere intruders. The plaintiff, a municipal
corporation, had by vote let the locus year by year from 1829 to 1875.
The court instructed the jury that to show title the town must prove
open, adverse, actual and exclusive possession for twenty continuous
years, and " that the votes, though they were evidence of a claim of
right on the part of the town, were not sufficient to prove title by pos-
session unless the lessees took actual possession under them, that it was
not necessary for the plaintiff town to show that the possession of its
lessees was continuous in the sense of their being on the premises all
the time, ana that if the lessees were in possession of any part of said
East Beach (the locus), under the votes it might be considered that they
were in possession of the whole for the purpose of acquiring title by
possession by the town." Held, that the instruction under the circum-
stances contained no error entitling the defenda.nts to a new trial. Held,
furt.er. that passage over the locus by the inhabitants of the town to
get seaweed or sand, or use of the locus for temporary deposit of sea-
weed, would not amount to an interruption of the possession : Id.
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There being evidence to show that the locus was known as the East
Beach, Held, that it was for the jury to determine whether or -not the
town let the locus by the name of the East Beach : Id.
NOTICE
Bona fide Purchase-Lis pendens- Consderation.-To subject a
purchaser to the not:ce of lis pendens, in the absence of actual notice,
the purchase must be made from one who was a party to the suit at the
time: .Aarchbanks v. Banks, 44 Ark.
A purchaser, though without notice of outstanding equities, is not an
innocent purchaser unless he has paid the whole consideration. Pay-
ment of part and securing the residue to be paid, are not sufficient.
But he has an equity to reclaim out of the property thl part innocently
paid : Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Mines and llining.
Agreements between-Liability.-Partners may make any agreements
they see proper for the management of their joint affairs; but the pro-
visions of such agreements are liable, at least in a court of equity, to be
controlled or qualified, or to be held altogether waived, when the assent
of all the partners may be fairly inferred from their acts and declarations
in the conduct of the firm affairs : Hall v. Sannoner, 44 Ark.
One partner is not liable to another for an honest mistake of judg-
ment as to what will be most beneficial to the common interest: Id.
Surviving Partner-Expenses of unsuccessful Litigation.-A surviving
partner who, in good faith -and under an honest belief that he has a
good defence, resists, by litigation, but unsuccessfully, the collection of
a claim against the partnership estate, will be entitled to contribution
for the reasonable expenses of the litigation as part of the expenses of
winding up the partnership affairs: Lee v. Dolan, 39 N. J. Eq.
PATENT. See Eguity.
Receiver.-A receiver of an insolvent debtor is entitled to a patent
right belonging to the debtor: Petition of Keach, 14 R. I.
The words in this statutory provision "exempted from attachment by
law," mean exempt by statute : Mo.
Under this statutory provision the court may order the debtor to
assign his patent right to the receiver : Id.
Claims for Combinations.-In patents for combinations of mechanism,
limitations and provisos imposed by the inventor, especially such as
were introduced into an application after it had been persistently
rejected, must be strictly constr'ued against the inventor and in favor
of the public, and looked upon as in the nature of disclaimers: Sargezt
v. Ball Safe and Lock Co., S. 0O. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
PAYMENT.
Application of.-The right off a creditor to make application of pay-
ments to one of several debts owing from his debtor, applies onli to
those debts then due; and does not apply at all where the debtor aim-
self makes the appropriation : ,9ates v. Burkett, 44 Ark. .
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PLEADING.
Replication-Fraud.-A replication of fraud to a plea of release must
set out the fraudulent acts relied on, that the court may determine
whether they amount to fraud, and that the defendant may know on
what to take issue: Friedburg v. Knight, 14 R. I.




Repeal by Implication.-Where there are two statutes on the same
subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from the framework
and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the whole sub-
ject, and to be a complete and perfect system in itself, the last act must
be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it
shall prevail, and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed:
Bracken v. Smith, 39 N. J. Eq.
STREET. See Action; Constitutional Law.
SUNDAY.
Contract-Ratificatio.-A contract of sale made on Sunday is void;
but the parties to it may, on a subsequent week. day, affirm or adopt its
terms, and so become bound by them; and a receipt of the purchase.
money by the vendor on a week day, would be an affirmance of it and
make it good, at least from that time. And a demand of payment on a
week day would have the same effect as to the vendor, and would com-
pel the purchaser to elect either to adopt the Sunday terms or to insist
on their invalidity: McKinney v. .Demby, 44 Ark.
TAX. See Constitutional Law.
TAXATION
Exemption of Railroad-Subseguent Purchaser- Consolidation.-
Exemption from taxation granted to a railroad corporation is a personal
privilege, incapable of transfer, and does not pass to the purchaser of
the road under a mortgage: Arkansus .Midland Railroad Co. v. Berry,
44 Ark.
The exemption from taxation granted by charter to the Arkansas Mid-
land Railroad Company, was lost by the subsequent consolidation of that
company with the Little Rock and Helena Railroad Company, forming
the Central Railroad Company: Id.
TENANTS IN COBi'ON. See I.Fauds, Statute of.
UNITED ST.ATES.
Pre-emption Laws-Requirement of Residence.-The pre-emption
law3 of the United States are intended for the benefit of persons making
a setlement upon the public lands, followed by residence and improve-
